中国外交部施压巴布亚新几内亚,迫使台湾贸易代表处撤离
Chinese Foreign Ministry pressures Papua New Guinea into forcing out Taiwan's trade mission
- 11月6日,巴布亚新几内亚向驻莫尔兹比港的台湾代表发出新的限期离境通牒,迫使台北关闭代表处并终止医疗及奖学金项目。 Papua New Guinea issued a renewed departure ultimatum to Taiwanese representatives in Port Moresby on November 6, forcing Taipei to shut its mission and end medical and scholarship programs.
- 台湾随即暂停新增巴布亚新几内亚液化天然气现货采购;台湾此前占巴新天然气出口总量的三分之一,该供应亦满足台湾8%的天然气需求。 Taiwan halted new spot purchases of Papua New Guinea liquefied natural gas, cutting off a buyer that previously took one-third of the Pacific nation's exports and supplied 8 percent of Taiwan's gas.
- 11月17日亚太经合组织(APEC)峰会前夕,马拉佩在深圳与习近平会面时承认,面对国内反对声浪,关闭代表处“并不容易”,同时表态支持北京“为实现统一所作的努力”。 Meeting Xi Jinping in Shenzhen on November 17 ahead of the APEC summit, Prime Minister James Marape admitted the closure 'wasn't easy' amid domestic pushback while pledging support for Beijing's 'efforts for reunification.'
据《每日独行者》(Daily Maverick)和半岛电视台11月报道,在中国外交部的持续施压下,巴布亚新几内亚迫使台湾撤离其驻莫尔兹比港的非官方贸易代表处。11月6日,巴新当局向台湾驻处人员发出新的限期离境通牒,迫使台北关闭机构、终止医疗与奖学金援助,并暂停采购液化天然气。这一断供令莫尔兹比港承受重创:台湾此前从巴新采购的天然气占自身进口总量的8%,相当于该太平洋岛国出口总量的三分之一。11月17日亚太经合组织(APEC)峰会前夕,巴新总理詹姆斯·马拉佩在深圳与习近平会晤时承认关闭代表处“并不容易”,同时表态支持北京“为实现统一所作的努力”。
此次驱逐行动综合运用了经济胁迫与灰区渐进蚕食的手段。自2019年北京开始在太平洋地区挖角台北邦交国,并在2023年后挤压台湾驻南非非官方机构以来,这套策略已趋于成熟。尽管莫尔兹比港除1999年短暂转向外自1976年起便承认北京,但中共涉外机构如今正利用市场准入与国有能源采购承诺,系统性抹除台湾的商业立足点。先是悄然施压,随后由国有买家接盘滞销出口,借此加深太平洋岛国对中国大陆资本的依赖,最终使台北的正式邦交国缩减至12个。
真正承受冲击的是普通民众。巴布亚新几内亚当地社区失去了台湾医疗队和大学奖学金项目,而中国纳税人则不得不为国有能源采购协议及太平洋地区的金元外交买单——与此同时,国内审查机构却在微博上悉数封杀相关讨论。莫尔兹比港以三分之一的出口份额换取了坐在习近平身旁的一席之地,也让北京的决策者得以更牢固地掌控太平洋岛国政治。
Chinese Foreign Ministry pressure forced Papua New Guinea to push out Taiwan’s unofficial trade office in Port Moresby, Daily Maverick and Al Jazeera reported in November. On November 6, Port Moresby issued a renewed departure ultimatum to Taiwanese staff, forcing Taipei to shut its mission, end medical and scholarship aid, and halt liquefied natural gas purchases. The gas cut hurt. Taiwan bought 8 percent of its gas from Papua New Guinea, accounting for one-third of the Pacific nation’s exports. Meeting Xi Jinping in Shenzhen on November 17 before the APEC summit, Prime Minister James Marape admitted the closure “wasn’t easy” while backing Beijing’s “efforts for reunification.”
The eviction deploys Economic Coercion and Gray-Zone Incrementalism refined since Beijing began poaching Taipei’s Pacific allies in 2019 and squeezing Taiwan’s unofficial offices in South Africa after 2023. Although Port Moresby recognized Beijing in 1976 save for a brief 1999 switch, the Chinese Communist Party’s foreign apparatus now uses trade access and state gas buying pledges to erase Taiwan’s commercial footholds. Quiet coercion comes first. State buyers then absorb stranded exports, deepening Pacific reliance on mainland capital while leaving Taipei with 12 formal allies.
Ordinary citizens absorb the shock. Papua New Guinea’s communities lose Taiwanese medical teams and university scholarships, while Chinese taxpayers fund state energy deals and Pacific patronage that domestic censors scrub from Weibo. Port Moresby traded a third of its exports for a seat beside Xi, handing Beijing’s planners a stronger grip over Pacific Island politics.
在微博和知乎上,民族主义评论者将莫尔兹比港的逐客令吹捧为北京“一个中国原则”的胜利,并嘲讽台北停止采购巴布亚新几内亚液化天然气的决定。官方背景账号则将此次驱逐与中国与巴新建交50周年挂钩,声称台湾的各类非官方贸易代表处正面临全面关闭的局面。
Across Weibo and Zhihu, nationalist commentators celebrated Port Moresby's ultimatum as a victory for Beijing's 'one-China principle' and mocked Taipei's decision to stop buying Papua New Guinea liquefied natural gas. State-affiliated accounts framed the expulsion alongside the 50th anniversary of China-PNG diplomatic ties as proof that Taiwan's unofficial trade missions face total closure.
中国大陆社交平台及官媒悉数抹除了马拉佩承认该国国内反对关闭代表处的表态,以及前总理彼得·奥尼尔的批评言论。搜索结果同样屏蔽了莫尔兹比港因失去三分之一出口买家而面临的经济风险,并审查了关于北京在太平洋地区施加贸易压力的讨论。
Mainland platforms and state media scrubbed Prime Minister James Marape's acknowledgment of internal opposition to the closure, as well as domestic criticism from former prime minister Peter O'Neill. Search feeds also omitted the economic risk facing Port Moresby from losing a buyer for one-third of its exports and censored debate over Beijing's trade pressure in the Pacific.
巴布亚新几内亚自1976年起与北京保持正式外交关系(仅在1999年短暂转向台北),但数十年来一直允许台湾在莫尔兹比港设立贸易代表处。在莫尔兹比港于2026年7月首次发出关闭通知后,中国外交部不仅表示欢迎,还释放出愿承接转口液化天然气出口的信号。这一做法呼应了北京在2023至2026年间对台湾驻南非非官方代表处的施压行动——目前台湾仅剩12个邦交国,其中包括三个太平洋岛国。
Papua New Guinea has maintained formal diplomatic ties with Beijing since 1976, save for a brief 1999 switch to Taipei, yet had hosted Taiwan's Port Moresby trade office for decades. After welcoming Port Moresby's initial July 2026 closure notice, China's Foreign Ministry signaled readiness to absorb redirected LNG exports, echoing a 2023-2026 pressure campaign against Taipei's unofficial office in South Africa that left Taiwan with formal ties to only 12 nations, including three Pacific Island states.